Ronald Reid's Three Topoi

Reid's Three Topoi provide a basic framework for understanding pro-war rhetoric and propaganda. (1) Territorial appeals, (2) ethnocentric appeals, and (3) appeals to optimism characterize pro-war rhetoric.[1] Reid also defines a fourth appeal, war aims. However, because this fourth aim supports the other topoi, it is often not identified as a separate category.[1] Due to these appeals, “American presidents have been able to impart a positive value to [the nation’s wars] as well as justify the nation’s involvement."[2] By understanding the persuasiveness of these appeals, Reid believes one can better understand wartime behavior.[1]

Biography

Ronald F. Reid, a Professor of Communication Studies at the University of Massachusetts Amherst at Amherst, retired in 1991 after 32 years of teaching.[3] Reid received a bachelor's from Pepperdine, a master's from University of New Mexico, and a Ph.D. from Purdue.[3]

Territorial appeals

Territorial appeals “taps into the ‘lower’ instincts we share with the animal kingdom."[4] As most animal species “mark off units of physical space” as “theirs” and will fight to retain that space, “many countries, led by the U.S., have developed a global sense of territoriality.”[1][4] As a result, nations “regard physical space as property” and are prepared to defend that property.[4] The object of the territorial appeal is to gain support for war by convincing the audience that the country is in danger.[1] Countries are more willing to support war when they feel their land is threatened.[1][4] Just as “a defending animal’s willingness to fight correlates with the extent to which its territory is invaded,” a human's willingness to fight correlates with the extent to which his country is threatened.[1]

Expansionism

Territorial appeals are often used to portray “expansionism as defensive by depicting it as a response to an existing outside threat or honorable effort to recover territory” that was unfairly taken.[1][2] Thus, through territorial appeal, “even unjustified American imperialism…can be characterized as defensive.” [1][4]

Encroachment appeals

Encroachment appeals are reminiscent of the domino theory.[1] By “narrating recent ‘encroachments’ along the frontier,” the orator proposes these seemingly isolated attacks are part of a bigger takeover conspiracy.[1]

Metaphysical appeals

There are some ideas/virtues countries assume as property.[1] “A populace may be motivated to embark upon a course of war because of the threat posed to its national ideals by a competing ideology."[2] Therefore, an orator can demonstrate a metaphysical territorial appeal by showing a threat to these ideals.[1]

Ethnocentric appeals

The Ethnocentric Appeal states that if the individuals in a culture belong and identify to it, they are likely to think their culture is superior to other cultures.[1] Ordinary ethnocentricity tends to lead those of a culture to ignore "outsiders."[1] The Ethnocentric Appeal concentrates on creating an ‘Us vs. Them’ mentality.[1] According to ethnocentricity, individuals often see their culture as superior to others. Therefore, when an orator is able to “establish a ‘realistic’ image of the enemy's savagery,” he “eliminate[s] peace as a viable alternative to war."[5] For example, during the American Revolution, the government told the people "God's plan of history called for progress, and the Revolution was an integral part of that plan."[6] This sets up the notion that "they" were "evil" and we are "good" because God is on our side.[6]

Emotional intensity

Pro-war rhetoric must "arouse ethnocentrism to a high level of emotional intensity."[1] To achieve this:

  1. The outsider must be hated.[1] To create hatred, orators use “decivilizing vehicles – including references to acts of nature, mechanized processes, predaceous animals, barbarous actions, and violent crimes."[5]
  2. The opposing culture must be shown as a possible threat, using "intense language which exploits the most basic and strongly held cultural values."[1] By making the opposing culture appear threatening, people of the "superior culture" will have more reason to be defensive.[1]

Appeals to optimism

An Appeal to Optimism creates the illusion war is not bad and that it has its positives.[1] This can be achieved in four ways:

  1. By controlling the news, don't tell the public what is going poorly.[7]
  2. Don't give the impression of being unprepared.[1]
  3. Show we’re stronger than our “enemy” through our “nation’s material strengths."[1]
  4. Use scapegoats to blame for wartime losses; “when the scapegoats are removed, victory will follow."[1] Reagan's war on drugs “absolve[d] individuals of direct blame for their addictions and instead concentrate[d] on substances and nebulous ‘drug criminals’ as the enemies."[8] Also, this is trying to show the audience that we are winning the war in different ways. This appeal uses spiritual phrases and phrases that show the strength of the military.[1][8] “The necessity of protecting [a country's] ideals ‘transcends limited human powers'."[7] This appeal is intended to instill hope and confidence for a victory in the audience's mind.[7]

Appeals to war aims

War Aims support former appeals and provide an ending goal for the war.[1][7] Missions “rhetorically create the sense of an objective response."[7] Nations want to bring about more peace and security.[1] For example, the war aims for security protect from future territorial threats of enemies. Permanent peace will ensure security.[7] If “the aim is total overthrow of the enemy,” the language is ambiguous, unclear, and utopian.[1] For example, “We seek to create a massive change."[8] If the “aims reflects a desire for security,” the language expresses clear anticipated results.[1] Presidents will “define an issue [and] the possible resolutions to that issue."[8]

References
  1. Reid, Ronald F. "New England Rhetoric and the French War, 1754-1760: A Case Study in the Rhetoric of War." Communication Monographs 43 (1997): 259-286, The New York Times. January 15, 1992.
  2. Bass, Jeff D. “Bass, Jeff D. “The Rhetorical Opposition to Controversial Wars: Rhetorical Timing as a Generic Consideration.” The Western Journal of Speech Communication 43” (Summer 1979): 180-191.
  3. University of Massachusetts Amherst Obituaries, “UMASS Chronicles”. August 23, 2002
  4. Donald, Ralph. “An Appeal to Fear Ain’t Nothin’ New: George W. Bush’s Middle East War Rhetoric and Territoriality in American Propaganda Films of World War II.” American Studies Today 16 (2007): 18-27.
  5. Ivie, Robert L. “The Metaphor of Force in Prowar Discourse: The Case of 1812.” Quarterly Journal of Speech 68 (1982): 240-253.
  6. Reid, Ronald F. "Varying Historical Interpretations of the American Revolution:Some Rhetorical Perspectives." Communication Quarterly 23(2) (Spring 1975): 5-15.
  7. Procter, David E. “The Rescue Mission: Assigning Guilt to a Chaotic Scene.” The Western Journal of Speech Communications 51 (1987): 245-255.
  8. Elwood, William N. “Declaring War on the Home Front: Metaphor, Presidents, and the War on Drugs.” Metaphor and Symbolic Activity 10(2) (1995): 93-114.
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