Nostalgia for the Soviet Union

The social phenomenon of nostalgia for the era of the Soviet Union (Russian: Ностальгия по СССР, romanized: Nostal'giya po SSSR), can include its politics, its society, its culture, its superpower status, or simply its aesthetics.[1][2][3] Such nostalgia occurs among people in Russia and other post-Soviet states, as well as among people born in the Soviet Union but long since living abroad, and even among Communists and Soviet sympathizers from elsewhere in the world. It is associated with Soviet patriotism.

Armenians celebrate the Soviet victory over Nazi Germany, 9 May 2018
People in Saint Petersburg at the Immortal Regiment, carrying portraits of their ancestors who fought in the Great Patriotic War.
Stamp of Alexei Leonov, USSR, 1967
Joseph Stalin on a "stalinobus" in Saint Petersburg, 2010.

In 2004, the television channel Nostalgiya, its logo featuring stylized hammer-and-sickle imagery, was launched in Russia.

Russia has extensively relied on nostalgia for the USSR to support its war effort during the 2022 invasion of Ukraine.[4][5]

Polling

Ever since the fall of the USSR and the Eastern Bloc, annual polling by the Levada Center has shown that over 50 percent of Russia's population lamented its collapse, with the only exception to this being in the year 2012 when support for the Soviet Union dipped below 50 percent. A 2018 poll showed that 66% of Russians regretted the fall of the Soviet Union, setting a 15-year record, and the majority of these regretting opinions came from people older than 55.[6][7]

In 2011, a poll conducted by Pew Research Center found that 82% of Ukrainians, 61% of Russians and 56% of Lithuanians believed the standard of living has had a bad influence since 1991, respectively.[8] It also found that a further 34% of Ukrainians, 42% of Russians and 45% of Lithuanians approved the change to a market economy.[9]

A poll in 2013 conducted by Gallup found that a majority of respondents in Armenia, Kyrgyzstan, Ukraine, Russia, Tajikistan, Moldova and Belarus claimed that the breakup of the Soviet Union has casued more harm than good. A further 33% of Georgians and 31% of Azerbaijanis also agreed with the statement.[10] A 2012 survey commissioned by Canrgie Endowment found that 38% of Armenians concurring that their country "will always have need of a leader like Stalin".[11]

In 2017, another poll conducted by Pew Research Center found that 69% of Russians, 54% of Belarusians, 70% of Moldovans and 79% of Armenians claimed that the breakup of the Soviet Union was a bad thing for their country. With the exception of Estonia, the percentage of people who agreed with the statement was higher amongst people aged 35 or over. 57% of Georgians and 58% of Russians also said that Joseph Stalin played a very/mostly positive role in history.[12]

Reasons

Wall advertisement at the "Soviet Times" pub in Moscow

According to polls, what is missed most about the former Soviet Union was its shared economic system, which provided financial stability.[13] Neoliberal economic reforms after the fall of the USSR, in particular privatization and austerity, resulted in harsh living standards for the general population, with sharp increases in unemployment, poverty and mortality rates.[14][15][16][17][18][19] Policies associated with privatization also allowed much of the country's economy to fall in the hands of a newly established business oligarchy.[20] The sense of belonging to a great superpower was a secondary reason for the nostalgia; many felt humiliated and betrayed by their experiences throughout the 1990s and blamed the upheaval on advisors from Western powers, especially as NATO moved closer into Russia's sphere of influence.[13]

According to Kristen Ghodsee, a researcher on post-communist Eastern Europe:

Only by examining how the quotidian aspects of daily life were affected by great social, political and economic changes can we make sense of the desire for this collectively imagined, more egalitarian past. Nobody wants to revive 20th century totalitarianism. But nostalgia for communism has become a common language through which ordinary men and women express disappointment with the shortcomings of parliamentary democracy and neoliberal capitalism today.[21]

According to the Levada Center poll (November 2016), the people mainly miss the Soviet Union because of the destruction of the joint economic system of its 15 republics (53%); people lost the feeling of belonging to a great power (43%); mutual distrust and cruelty have increased (31%); the feeling that you are at home in any part of the USSR was lost (30%); and connection with friends, relatives lost (28%).[22] Levada Center sociologist Karina Pipiya says that economic factors played the most significant part in rising nostalgia for the USSR in the 2018 poll, as opposed to loss of prestige or national identity, noting that a strong majority of Russians "regret that there used to be more social justice and that the government worked for the people and that it was better in terms of care for citizens and paternalistic expectations."[23] A June 2019 Levada Center poll found that 59% of Russians felt that the Soviet government "took care of ordinary people". Joseph Stalin's favorability also hit record highs the spring of that year.[24]

During the Russian invasion of Ukraine

The Victory Banner and a Z symbol on a Russian military vehicle in Kazan.
The flag of the Soviet Union has been on many Russian tanks.
The Soviet-era Victory Banner has been flown in many occupied towns and cities in Ukraine.
In some cases, the red-azure flag of the Ukrainian SSR is sometimes used in opposition to the blue-yellow flag of Ukraine.

Following the invasion, many Russian tanks were shown flying the old flag of the Soviet Union alongside the pro-war Z military symbol. American political scientist Mark Beissinger told France 24 that the purpose of using these symbols was not necessarily to do with communism, but rather a desire to re-establish "Russian domination over Ukraine", noting that the use of Soviet symbols in most post-Soviet states (with the exception of Russia and Belarus) is often seen as a provocative act.[25]

In addition to symbolism, the Bolshevism of the Russian forces manifests itself in their toponymic policy: the occupiers everywhere "return" their Soviet names to the captured settlements and cities (as well as to those they want to capture). This is officially motivated by the desire to restore historical justice. In fact, as a rule, anti-historical names given by the Bolsheviks in the 1920s and 1930s are restored instead of either returned historical (pre-revolutionary) names or Ukrainianized names obtained as part of the company for the decommunization of the country in 2014-22. Examples: Artemivsk instead of Bakhmut, Krasny (Red) Liman instead of Liman, Volodarske instead of Nikolske, Stakhanov instead of Kadiivka, etc.[26][27][28][29]

Events

Artwork of the "Grandmother with a red flag", Anna Ivanovna, used in Russian propaganda.

In April 2022, a video of a Ukrainian woman named Anna Ivanovna[30] greeting Ukrainian soldiers at her home near Dvorichna, whom she thought to be Russian, with a Soviet flag went viral on pro-Russian social media, and featured on Russian state-controlled media. The woman said that she and her husband had "waited, prayed for them, for Putin and all the people".[31] The Ukrainian soldiers gave her food, but went on to mock her and trample on her Soviet flag, after which she said "my parents died for that flag in World War Two".[32] This was used by Russian propagandists to prove that the Russian invasion had popular support, in spite of the fact that most Ukrainians – even in Russian-speaking regions – opposed the invasion.[32] In Russia, murals, postcards, street art, billboards, chevrons and stickers depicting the woman have been created.[31][33] In Russian-controlled Mariupol, a statue of her was unveiled.[32] She has been nicknamed "Grandmother (Russian: бабушка, romanized: babushka) Z",[31] and the "grandmother with a red flag" by Russians. Sergey Kiriyenko, a senior Russian politician, referred to her as "Grandma Anya".[34]

Anna told the Ukrayinska Pravda that she met the soldiers with a Soviet flag not out of sympathy, but because she felt the need to reconcile with them so that they would not "destroy" the village and Ukraine after her house was shelled, but now feels like a "traitor" due to the way her image has been used by Russia.[30] According to Ukrainian journalists, Anna and her son later fled to Kharkiv after their house was being shelled by the Russians.[34][35]

On August 26, the Soviet Victory banner was hoisted over the village Pisky, a fortified area just off Donetsk whose capture is strategic for Russia, further pushing Ukrainian forces away from Donbas.[36]

Additionally, many of Lenin statues, which had been taken down by Ukrainian activists in the preceding years, were re-erected by Russian occupiers in Russian-controlled areas.[37][38][39][40]

See also

Communist nostalgia in Europe

References

  1. Taylor, A. (9 June 2014). "Calls for a return to 'Stalingrad' name test the limits of Putin's Soviet nostalgia". Washington Post.
  2. "Why Russia Backs The Eurasian Union". Business Insider. The Economist. 22 August 2014. Often seen as an artefact of Vladimir Putin's nostalgia for the Soviet Union, the Eurasian Union has been largely ignored in the West.
  3. Nikitin, V. (5 March 2014). "Putin is exploiting the legacy of the Soviet Union to further Russia's ends in Ukraine". The Independent. Archived from the original on 29 March 2015.
  4. Young, Pareisa (11 March 2022). "Ukraine: Russian troops flying Soviet flag, symbol of 're-establishing Russian domination'". The Observers - France 24. Archived from the original on 27 April 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  5. Harding, Luke (23 April 2022). "Back in the USSR: Lenin statues and Soviet flags reappear in Russian-controlled cities". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 4 May 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  6. "Ностальгия по СССР" [Nostalgia for the USSR] (in Russian). levada.ru. 19 December 2018.
  7. Maza, Christina (19 December 2018). "Russia vs. Ukraine: More Russians Want the Soviet Union and Communism Back Amid Continued Tensions". Newsweek. Retrieved 20 December 2018.
  8. "Chapter 3. Evaluating Societal Change". Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. 2011-12-05. Retrieved 2023-01-17.
  9. "Confidence in Democracy and Capitalism Wanes in Former Soviet Union". Pew Research Center's Global Attitudes Project. 2011-12-05. Retrieved 2023-01-17.
  10. Inc, Gallup (2013-12-19). "Former Soviet Countries See More Harm From Breakup". Gallup.com. Retrieved 2023-01-17. {{cite web}}: |last= has generic name (help)
  11. Times, The Moscow (2013-03-02). "Poll Finds Stalin's Popularity High". The Moscow Times. Retrieved 2023-01-17.
  12. Masci, David. "In Russia, nostalgia for Soviet Union and positive feelings about Stalin". Pew Research Center. Retrieved 2023-01-17.
  13. "Why do so many people miss the Soviet Union?". The Washington Post. 21 December 2016.
  14. Ciment, James (21 August 1999). "Life expectancy of Russian men falls to 58". BMJ: British Medical Journal. 319 (7208): 468. doi:10.1136/bmj.319.7208.468a. ISSN 0959-8138. PMC 1116380. PMID 10454391.
  15. Men, Tamara; Brennan, Paul; Boffetta, Paolo; Zaridze, David (25 October 2003). "Russian mortality trends for 1991-2001: analysis by cause and region". BMJ: British Medical Journal. 327 (7421): 964–0. doi:10.1136/bmj.327.7421.964. ISSN 0959-8138. PMC 259165. PMID 14576248.
  16. Izyumov, Alexei (2010). "Human Costs of Post-communist Transition: Public Policies and Private Response". Review of Social Economy. 68 (1): 93–125. doi:10.1080/00346760902968421. ISSN 0034-6764. JSTOR 41288494. S2CID 154520098.
  17. Azarova, Aytalina; Irdam, Darja; Gugushvili, Alexi; Fazekas, Mihaly; Scheiring, Gábor; Horvat, Pia; Stefler, Denes; Kolesnikova, Irina; Popov, Vladimir; Szelenyi, Ivan; Stuckler, David; Marmot, Michael; Murphy, Michael; McKee, Martin; Bobak, Martin; King, Lawrence (1 May 2017). "The effect of rapid privatisation on mortality in mono-industrial towns in post-Soviet Russia: a retrospective cohort study". The Lancet Public Health. 2 (5): e231–e238. doi:10.1016/S2468-2667(17)30072-5. ISSN 2468-2667. PMC 5459934. PMID 28626827.
  18. Mattei, Clara E. (2022). The Capital Order: How Economists Invented Austerity and Paved the Way to Fascism. University of Chicago Press. pp. 301–302. ISBN 978-0226818399. If, in 1987–1988, 2 percent of the Russian people lived in poverty (i.e., survived on less than $4 a day), by 1993–1995 the number reached 50 percent: in just seven years half the Russian population became destitute.
  19. Ghodsee, Kristen; Orenstein, Mitchell A. (2021). Taking Stock of Shock: Social Consequences of the 1989 Revolutions. New York: Oxford University Press. pp. 195–196. doi:10.1093/oso/9780197549230.001.0001. ISBN 978-0197549247. In the mortality belt of the European former Soviet Union, an aggressive health policy intervention might have prevented tens of thousands of excess deaths, or at least generated a different perception of Western intentions. Instead, Western self-congratulatory triumphalism, the political priority to irreversibly destroy the communist system, and the desire to integrate East European economies into the capitalist world at any cost took precedence.
  20. Scheidel, Walter (2017). The Great Leveler: Violence and the History of Inequality from the Stone Age to the Twenty-First Century. Princeton University Press. pp. 51, 222–223. ISBN 978-0691165028. Following the dissolution of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and then of the Soviet Union itself in late 1991, exploding poverty drove the surge in income inequality: within three years, the proportion of people living in poverty had tripled to more than a third of Russia's population. By the time of the financial crisis of 1998, their share had grown to almost 60 percent. Yet over the longer term, rising inequality has been boosted by the decompression of wage incomes, much of it resulting from growing regional variation. Strongly disproportionate income growth in Moscow and in oil-and-gas-rich parts of the country point to the successful capture of rents by those in the highest income-brackets. Wealth concentration at the very top had been made possible by the transfer of state assets to private owners.
  21. "Dr. Kristen Ghodsee, Bowdoin College – Nostalgia for Communism". WAMC Northeast Public Radio. 1 November 2011.
  22. "The Fall of the Soviet Union". Levada.ru. 9 January 2017.
  23. Balmforth, Tom (19 December 2018). "Russian nostalgia for Soviet Union reaches 13-year high". Reuters. Retrieved December 23, 2018.
  24. "Most Russians Say Soviet Union 'Took Care of Ordinary People' – Poll". The Moscow Times. 24 June 2019. Retrieved June 25, 2019.
  25. Young, Pareisa (11 March 2022). "Ukraine: Russian troops flying Soviet flag, symbol of 're-establishing Russian domination'". The Observers - France 24. Archived from the original on 27 April 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  26. На окупованій Донеччині росіяни повертають старі назви селищам
  27. «ВФУ обстреляли Красный Лиман, есть жертвы»
  28. "'It's a reference to the USSR — to its return' Why is the Kremlin incorporating Soviet symbols into its war propaganda?".
  29. "Российские оккупанты 9 мая запланировали вернуть Луганску его советское название".
  30. Karlovsky, Denis. ""Бабця з прапором СРСР" кляне російську армію, бо та зруйнувала її дім" ["Grandmother with the flag of the USSR" swears at the Russian army, because it destroyed her house]. Ukrayinska Pravda (in Ukrainian). Archived from the original on 2022-05-05. Retrieved 2022-05-05.
  31. Sorokina, Yanina (4 May 2022). "Explainer: How a Ukrainian Pensioner Became a Pro-War Symbol in Russia". The Moscow Times. Archived from the original on 4 May 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  32. Bettiza, Sofia; Khomenko, Svyatoslav (15 June 2022). "Babushka Z: The woman who became a Russian propaganda icon". BBC News. Retrieved 5 July 2022.
  33. Mohan, Geeta (4 May 2022). "Old woman with red flag is now the face of Russian loyalty in this war". India Today. Archived from the original on 4 May 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  34. "'It's a reference to the USSR — to its return' Why is the Kremlin incorporating Soviet symbols into its war propaganda?". Meduza. 5 May 2022. Archived from the original on 5 May 2022. Retrieved 5 May 2022.
  35. "«Россия пошла на нас злом таким, паршиво». Украинские журналисты нашли бабушку с красным флагом, которую использует российская пропаганда" ["Russia went at us with such evil, lousy." Ukrainian journalists found the grandmother with a red flag used by Russian propaganda]. The Insider (in Russian). 5 May 2022. Archived from the original on 25 May 2022. Retrieved 5 May 2022.
  36. Stepanenko, Kateryna; Hird, Karolina; Kagan, Frederick W.; Barros, George (25 August 2022). "Russian Offensive Campaign Assessment, August 25". Institute for the Study of War. Retrieved 26 August 2022.
  37. Harding, Luke (23 April 2022). "Back in the USSR: Lenin statues and Soviet flags reappear in Russian-controlled cities". The Guardian. Archived from the original on 4 May 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  38. Fink, Andrew (20 April 2022). "Lenin Returns to Ukraine". The Dispatch. Archived from the original on 23 April 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  39. Bowman, Verity (27 April 2022). "Kyiv pulls down Soviet-era monument symbolising Russian-Ukrainian friendship". The Telegraph. Archived from the original on 27 April 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.
  40. Trofimov, Yaroslav (1 May 2022). "Russia's Occupation of Southern Ukraine Hardens, With Rubles, Russian Schools and Lenin Statues". The Wall Street Journal. Archived from the original on 3 May 2022. Retrieved 4 May 2022.

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