Cavalry in the American Civil War

The American Civil War saw cavalry tactics move largely away from the offensive towards the defensive, with the emphasis on screening, raiding, and reconnaissance. Development of the rifled musket had also rendered the cavalry charge both impractical and detrimental.

Recruiting poster for the First Battalion, New York Mounted Rifles.
Cavalry Soldier with Sword on Horseback, by Winslow Homer, 1863
Cavalry orderly, Rappahannock Station, Va., painting by Edwin Forbes.
An advance of the cavalry skirmish line, by Edwin Forbes.
Confederate cavalryman, by William L. Sheppard
Capt. James S. West, C.S.A. (Cavalry)

In the first half of the war, the Confederates enjoyed the advantage in cavalry, as southern men were more accustomed to the riding and shooting life, and most of the experienced cavalry officers from the regular army had chosen to side with the Confederacy.

By the second half, from 1863 onward, the Union Army had gained an equal cavalry capability, through Benjamin Grierson's brilliant deception tactics in the Mississippi valley, and Philip Sheridan's aggressive movements, while in command of the Army of the Shenandoah at the end of the war in Virginia.

Cavalry units proved highly expensive to maintain, and unscrupulous agents would often exploit shortages by supplying defective animals at exorbitant prices.

Types of mounted forces

There were four types of mounted forces prevalent in the Civil War.

  1. Cavalry were forces that fought principally on horseback, armed with carbines, pistols, and sabers. Only a small percentage of Civil War forces met this definition—primarily Union mounted forces in the Eastern Theater during the first half of the war. Confederate forces in the East generally carried neither carbines nor sabers. A few Confederate regiments in the Western Theater carried shotguns, especially early on in the war.
  2. Mounted infantry were forces that moved on horseback but dismounted for fighting on foot, armed principally with rifles. In the second half of the war, most of the units considered to be cavalry actually fought battles using the tactics of mounted infantry. An example of this was the celebrated "Lightning Brigade" of Col. John T. Wilder, which used horses to quickly arrive at a battlefield such as Chickamauga, but they deployed and fought using standard infantry formations and tactics. By contrast, at the Battle of Gettysburg, Federal cavalry under John Buford also dismounted to fight Confederate infantry, but they used conventional cavalry tactics, arms, and formations.
  3. Dragoons were hybrid forces that were armed as cavalrymen but were expected to fight on foot as well. The term comes from the French Army, representing a cross between light infantry and light cavalry. The fighting tactics of the forces deployed by Union General Philip Sheridan in 1864, and by Confederate General Wade Hampton after the Battle of Yellow Tavern, fit the dragoon model, although those units did not adopt the term.
  4. Irregular cavalry (partisan rangers or guerrillas) were generally mounted forces. There is little commonality as to their weapons—in general, any available were used. The Confederacy produced the most famous irregular leaders, including William Clarke Quantrill and John S. Mosby.

Roles

At the time of the Civil War, the cavalry had six major roles to play:[1]

  1. Reconnaissance
  2. Screen
  3. Flank security
  4. Attack
  5. Headquarters duties
  6. Raiding/interdiction

Of these missions, reconnaissance was the most important role for cavalry during the Civil War. Their inherent nature made them ideally suited to be the "eyes and ears" of an army's commander and keep him informed of the enemy's position and movements.[1][2] Cavalry had the agility and firepower to probe the enemy for weak points, set ambushes for isolated groups, and flee before the main force could overwhelm them. The widespread availability of field glasses only increased their information-gathering capability.[3]

Reconnaissance and screening was a crucial component in the Gettysburg Campaign, where cavalry under Union General Alfred Pleasonton attempted to find the wide-ranging Army of Northern Virginia on its invasion of the North, and Confederate cavalry under J.E.B. Stuart effectively employed counter-reconnaissance to screen passes in the Blue Ridge Mountains and hide Robert E. Lee's movements from George Meade and the Army of the Potomac. However, when Stuart was "cut loose" to conduct another raid around the Army of the Potomac, he deprived Lee of adequate reconnaissance at the beginning of the Battle of Gettysburg, one of the principal reasons for the Confederate defeat there.[4]

The use of cavalry for offensive action in the Civil War has come under contention in recent years. The conventional view is that cavalry's traditional role on the battlefield of was to use their sabers and lances to conduct a charge into enemy infantry and break up their formations. Such tactics were appropriate in previous generations when the infantry's primary weapon was the smoothbore musket, which only had an effective range of 100 yards. However, during the Civil War the rifle was the primary infantry weapon, and against a weapon with an effective range of 500 yards such shock tactics became ineffective and bloody. Instead, cavalry had to learn to fight dismounted, in effect becoming mounted infantry who used their horses only for mobility and fought on foot like normal infantry.[5][6] Furthermore, the terrain was also blamed for being less conducive to large cavalry maneuvers, particularly in the Eastern Theater which was broken up with an abundance of woodlands and farmlands.[7]

Historian Earl J. Hess disputes the impact the rifle had on cavalry tactics in the Civil War, noting that even in the era of smoothbore muskets infantry had always been able to defend itself against cavalry attacks; a cavalry charge against infantry in formation and ready to meet it almost always ended in failure.[6] Paddy Griffith observed that the United States never had a strong tradition of heavy cavalry which normally conducted such attacks and instead relied on dragoons and mounted infantry thanks in part to a cost-conscious Congress. Lacking a doctrinal basis for their use, Union cavalry only conducted a handful of cavalry charges against Confederate infantry in the first three years of the war and all were doomed to fail for reasons other than the rifle.[8] Contemporary accounts also prove that the saber continued to play an important role in cavalry combat: in an October 1864 report General Jubal Early complains that Confederate cavalry armed only with rifles were at a severe disadvantage in open country against Union cavalry who could fight on horseback with sabers.[2]

By the latter part of the war, offensive tactics had settled around a hybrid that mixed the qualities of both a traditional cavalry force and mounted infantry. A cavalry unit would use their superior mobility to approach the enemy but then dismount a majority of their force to attack on foot. The dismounted troopers would use weight of fire to assault the enemy's position, particularly if armed with new repeating rifles. Finally at the right moment, the mounted portion stationed on one or both flanks would conduct a saber charge (or, if lacking in sabers, use their revolvers). Among the dismounted troopers, one in every four was in charge of caring for the others' horses, keeping them out of danger yet close enough to allow for a quick remount.[9][10]

Long-distance raids were the most desirable mission for cavalrymen, primarily because of the fame that successful raids would bring, but they were often of little practical strategic value in comparison to the men and horses lost.[2] Jeb Stuart became famous for two audacious raids around the Army of the Potomac in 1862; his third such attempt, during the Gettysburg Campaign, lead to disaster for the Army of Northern Virginia. Inspired by the 'success' of these raids the Union attempted to mimic them but to mixed results. George Stoneman's raid in the Battle of Chancellorsville was a failure for, although it destroyed considerable Confederate property much of it was quickly repaired while at least 1,000 of his horses were ruined by the exertion. Meanwhile Benjamin Grierson's raid in the Vicksburg Campaign was a strategic masterpiece that diverted critical Confederate forces away from Ulysses S. Grant's army.[11][12]

Organization
U.S. Army Cavalry Sergeant, 1866

The United States Army (known also as the Regular Army) before the Civil War utilized the regiment as the principal unit of maneuver and training for its cavalry forces. There were five regiments of mounted soldier: the 1st and 2nd Dragoon regiments, the Regiment of Mounted Riflemen, and the 1st and 2nd Cavalry regiments. Each were similarly organized with ten companies (or troops), one troop commanded by a captain with a number of other commissioned and non-commissioned officers (NCOs) for around a hundred soldiers each. Two troops were further combined to form a squadron for five total. A regiment was commanded by a colonel (assisted by a lieutenant colonel and three majors) and included a staff which operated as part of the regimental headquarters.[13][14]

When a sixth regiment (3rd Cavalry) was founded in May 1861, it instead constituted twelve troops for a total of 1,278 soldiers. This included a permanent battalion structure with two squadrons to a battalion and each battalion with its own commanding officer and staff. Regiments raised by the states under the United States Volunteers mirrored the organization of the 3rd Cavalry starting in July. In August, Congress renumbered the Regular Army's mounted forces as the 1st through 6th Cavalry regiments. Then in July 1862 all cavalry regiments were reorganized around the twelve-troop model and the permanent battalion structure removed. Continued adjustments to the number of solders per regiment and troop made throughout the early part of the war were finalized in April 1863, when the authorized strength for a Union cavalry regiment was set at between 1,040 to 1,156.[15] Although permanent battalions were removed, Union forces continued to operate in the field as squadrons and battalions.[13] Independent battalions and companies of the Volunteers were also formed throughout the war.[16]

The Confederates organized their cavalry regiments along the same principals as the old Regular Army regiments with ten companies. In November 1861 each company was to have at minimum sixty privates, later increased to eighty in October 1862, also commanded by a captain with a number of other officers and NCOs. Each regiment was commanded by a colonel, assisted by a lieutenant colonel and a major, with its own regimental staff.[13][15][2] As with Union forces, the Confederates also formed independent battalions and companies of cavalry forces, and many partisan groups were formed which operated both within and outside of Confederate territory.[13][16] Additionally, at least one cavalry legion was formed early in the war by combining infantry and artillery forces into one large regiment, but the concept was soon abandoned for being too unwieldy.[16]

The actual size of cavalry regiments rarely if ever conformed to their paper strength. Sometimes they could be much larger: Turner Ashby for example grew his 7th Virginia Cavalry Regiment to over 1,400 troopers split between twenty-two and twenty-six companies in April 1862 by refusing to allow them to be divided into multiple regiments.[15] More likely, regiments were worn down by attrition until they were a fraction of their authorized size: Union regiments averaged between 400 to 600 total, while Confederate regiments averaged between 160 to 360 total.[15] In one extreme example, an unnamed Union regiment at the Battle of Five Forks numbered only 45 men.[17] More likely though, once a regiment was reduced to a certain size it was either disbanded or consolidated with other units, much to the chagrin of the veteran troopers. The states were mostly responsible for recruitment and many governors were more inclined to create brand new units as a form of political patronage rather than return an existing unit to full strength. Nevertheless, the Confederates did a better job than the Union at funneling replacements to existing regiments.[16]

unit number
Confederate Army[16]
regiments 137
legions 1
battalions (separate) 143
companies (separate) 101
unit number
Union Army[16]
regiments (Regular Army) 6
regiments (Volunteer Army) 266
battalions (separate) 45
companies (separate) 78

Above the regiment was a brigade which consisted of several regiments, and several brigades were combined into a division. Brigades and divisions were commanded by brigadier generals and major generals respectively, although for lack of a higher rank some Union cavalry brigades and divisions were commanded by colonels and brigadier generals instead. Both sides also eventually combined their cavalry forces into corps, grouping a number of divisions together.[16] Union brigades were numbered based on their position within their parent division, as were divisions within their corps, however Confederate units were known by their commanding officer's name.[18]

However, in the early years of the war, only the Confederates organized their regiments into larger units, allowing them to perform independent operations. The Army of the Potomac instead paired its cavalry regiments with infantry divisions, where they were often 'wasted' performing duties as couriers, orderlies and escorts. It was not until July 1862 when the Army of the Potomac collected its cavalry regiments into independent brigades, which were organized into a dedicated Cavalry Corps in February 1863. Similar developments played out with other Union armies.[18]

unit type low high average most frequent
Confederate Army[19]
divisions per corps 2 3 2.43 2
brigades per division 2 7 2.81 2
regiments per brigade 2 8 4.21 4
unit type low high average most frequent
Union Army[14]
divisions per corps 2 6 2.92 3
brigades per division 2 6 2.55 2
regiments per brigade 2 8 3.90 4

In both armies, the cavalry was accompanied by batteries or battalions of horse artillery, as well as its own train of ammunition and supply wagons.[20][21]

Equipment

Horses

The principal item of equipment for a cavalryman was the horse and one of the reasons both North and South initially hesitated in forming mounted units was because of financial considerations; each cavalry regiment cost $300,000 for initial organization with annual upkeep expenses tallying over $100,000. Both cavalries originally required recruits or local communities to provide horses, a policy that lasted briefly in the North, while the South maintained it throughout the war even though Richmond leaders recognized its serious drawbacks. While Confederate troopers bore the monetary cost of keeping themselves mounted, Union cavalrymen rode quartermaster-issued animals obtained through public contracts (although officers had to reimburse the cost of their mounts to the government). While open to fraud early in the war, once tightened regulations and stringent inspections were enforced, the contract system yielded an estimated 650,000 horses for Union armies during the war exclusive of an additional 75,000 confiscated in Confederate territory.[22][23]

Union army guidelines for cavalry horse selection mandated animals be at least 15 hands high, weighing minimally 950 pounds and aged between 4 and 10 years old, and be well-broken to bridle and saddle. Animals were to be dark colors and free from defects such as shallow breathing, deformed hooves, spavin or ringbone. Geldings were preferred for cavalry horses with the purchase of mares strictly prohibited outside absolute military emergency and stallions' volatility and aggressiveness made them generally unsuitable for service. In the Confederacy, limited horse numbers did not permit such selectivity in trying to keep their armies horsed.[24]

Cavalry horse prices varied throughout the war; in 1861 the maximum government price for cavalry horses was $119. However, relentless military demand caused prices to continually increase and by 1865 prices hovered near $190 per head. In the Confederacy horse prices rapidly spiraled upward due to animal scarcity and inflation costing over $3,000 by war's end.[25] The daily feed ration for Union cavalry horses was ten pounds of hay and fourteen pounds of grain which were ample and fulfilled the animals' nutritional needs if of good quality, however, the vagaries of the army supply system did not always insure prescribed forage amounts were delivered where most needed.[26]

On both sides volunteer officers often proved notably lax in promoting strict animal welfare, a shortcoming exacerbated by the absence of a trained and organized veterinary corps which allowed serious maladies like strangles, grease heel, farcy, and glanders to spread among army stock. The U.S. Congress finally created the rank of veterinary sergeant in March 1863, but the meager pay and rank held no inducement for qualified candidates to join the army. Repeated calls to establish a professional military veterinary service failed, and widespread waste, suffering, and destruction among army horses resulted; not until 1916 was an official U.S. army veterinary corps founded.[27]

Horses gave the cavalry forces significant mobility. In some operations, forces were pushed to the limit (such as Jeb Stuart's raid on Chambersburg, Pennsylvania, in 1862, where his troopers marched 80 miles (130 km) in 27 hours). Such excesses were extremely damaging to the readiness of the units and extensive recovery periods were required. Stuart, during the Gettysburg Campaign the following year, resorted to procuring replacement horses from local farmers and townspeople during his grueling trek northward around the Union army. In York County, Pennsylvania, following the Battle of Hanover, his men appropriated well over 1,000 horses from the region. Many of these untrained new mounts proved a hindrance during the subsequent fighting at East Cavalry Field during the battle of Gettysburg.[28]

Weaponry
Union cavalryman A.J. Blue armed with three pistols and a sword.

Some mounted forces used traditional infantry rifles. However, cavalrymen, particularly in the North, were frequently armed with three other weapons:

  • Carbines, were shorter in overall length, less cumbersome to carry mounted or dismounted, and easier to operate from horseback. But, its accuracy was greatly diminished compared to other long guns. Most carbines were .52- or .56-caliber, single-shot breech-loading weapons. They were manufactured by several different companies, but the most common were the Sharps rifle, the Burnside carbine, and the Smith carbine. Late in 1863, the seven-shot Spencer repeating carbine was introduced, but it was rarely deployed.[29] A notable exception was Union Colonel John T. Wilder, who equipped an entire brigade with repeaters (purchasing these himself and intending to deduct payment from the men's wages embarrassed the Government into paying Wilder for the weapons at $35 apiece) in May 1863, the first unit so equipped. His mounted infantry gained fame as the "Lightning Brigade" for their swift movements. One Confederate stated that Wilder's men could "load on Sunday and fire all week." (Confederate forces were able to use captured breechloaders but were unable to duplicate the metallic cartridges needed by the Spencer.)
  • Pistols, were generally preferred over sabers in the South, were usually six-shot revolvers, in .36- or .44-caliber, from Colt or Remington. They were useful only in close fighting since they had little accuracy. It was common for cavalrymen to carry two revolvers, for extra firepower, and John Mosby's troopers often carried four each.
  • Sabers, were used frequently by cavalrymen on both sides. They were terror weapons, more useful for instilling fear in their opponents than as practical offensive weapons; Confederate cavalrymen often avoided them simply because they considered sabers to be outmoded, unsuitable for the modern battlefield. One Southern cavalry commander noted that the only times during the war he used a saber was to roast meat over a fire. Despite some Southern attitudes towards such weapons, there were several notable instances where the saber saw much use by both sides, including the Battle of Brandy Station and the Battle of Gettysburg, Third Day cavalry battles. Notably, South Carolina cavalry regiments as well as the cavalry commanded by General Wade Hampton had an intense fondness for the saber. One officer in the 2nd South Carolina cavalry regiment was quoted saying, "There was nothing Hampton's men liked so well in a fight as a chance to use their sabers." The American Pattern of 1860 Light Cavalry Saber was lighter than the typical European saber, the latter being similar to the older U.S. Model 1840 Heavy Dragoon "wrist breaker".
  • Shotguns, were used during the early phases of the war, particularly by the Confederacy. Though capable of inflicting heavy damage at close range, they were mostly replaced once both sides got sufficient supplies of carbines.
  • Lances, were used alongside sabers by a select few cavalry regiments, such as the 5th Texas Cavalry and the 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry. Lances had been used since medieval times, but had been rendered obsolete since the invention of the Minié ball. During the Battle of Valverde, The 5th Texas Cavalry performed the only major lancer charge of the war, and was slaughtered, abandoning the lance after the battle. The 6th Pennsylvania Cavalry discontinued usage of the lance in May of 1863.[30]

Confederate cavalry
Sketch of 1st Virginia Cavalry
Sgt. John Richard Whitehead, Company G, 6th Battalion, Virginia Cavalry, Pittsylvania County, Virginia

A Southerner was, on average, considered a superior horseman to his Northern counterpart, especially early in the war. The common explanation for this situation was that roads in the rural South were generally poor, making for a greater reliance on horses for individual transportation, combined with a pervasive cavalier culture within the Southern aristocracy which emphasized equestrianism.[31][32] Historian Gregory J. W. Urwin has referred to such a broad generalization as a part of a "tired, overly-familiar myth" which explains away the South's defeat due to the North's industrial might.[33] Paddy Griffith also notes that, with each trooper having to supply their own horse, "[o]ne does not need to invoke any theory of 'Southern Cavaliers' or 'innate equestrian skills' to see that a soldier will do better if he rides his own cherished four-legged friend than if he is astride an anonymous item of government property."[11] Furthermore, both note these same factors made Southern troopers notoriously insubordinate: soldiers often refused to follow orders or went home whenever they felt like, and some officers refused to serve under commanders with whom they had petty grievances. In one remarkable case a Tennessee cavalry regiment unliterally decided to disband itself.[33][11]

Confederate soldiers owned their horses and were compensated on a monthly basis. If a soldier's horse was sick, injured, or killed, the soldier was responsible for returning home and replacing the horse at his own expense. The general rule was that the soldier had 60 days to return with a new horse or he was forced to become an infantryman, which was considered to be an ignominious fate.

The first prominent Confederate cavalry leader was J. E. B. Stuart, who achieved success in the First Battle of Bull Run against infantry. He was a flamboyant dresser and an audacious commander, wildly popular with the Southern public for his escapades in twice encircling the Army of the Potomac. These long-range reconnaissance missions accomplished little of military value but boosted Southern morale. After Stuart's death in 1864, he was replaced by Wade Hampton, who was a more mature, and arguably more effective, commander. Another Eastern commander of note was Turner Ashby, the "Black Knight of the Confederacy", who commanded Stonewall Jackson's cavalry forces in the Valley Campaign; he was killed in battle in 1862.

In the Western Theater, the most fearless, and ruthless, cavalry commander was Nathan Bedford Forrest, who achieved spectacular results with small forces but was an ineffective subordinate to the army commanders he was supposed to support, resulting in poorly coordinated battles. Much of the same issues could be said of Forrest's counterpart in the Army of Tennessee, John Hunt Morgan. In the Eastern Theater, the Partisan Ranger John Singleton Mosby succeeded in tying down upwards of 40,000 Federal troops defending rail lines and logistical hubs with only 100-150 irregulars. In the Trans-Mississippi Theater, John S. Marmaduke and "Jo" Shelby became prominent.

Further information: Cavalry Corps, Army of Northern Virginia

Union cavalry
A US Civil war soldier Cavalry [North] with sabre and Lefaucheux pistol; the brass guards on his shoulders were designed to protect against saber cuts
Union Cavalry capture Confederate artillery

The Union started the war with five Regular mounted regiments: the 1st and 2nd U.S. Dragoons, the 1st Mounted Rifles, and the 1st and 2nd Cavalry. These were renumbered the 1st through 5th U.S. Cavalry regiments, respectively, and a 6th was recruited. The Union was initially reluctant to enlist additional regiments, because of the expense, the understanding that training an effective cavalryman could take as long as two years, and the conventional wisdom that the rough and forested terrain of the United States, being so different from that of Western Europe, would make the deployment of Napoleonic-style cavalry forces ineffective. As the war progressed, the value of cavalry was eventually realized (primarily for non-offensive missions), and numerous state volunteer cavalry regiments were added to the army. While initially reluctant to form a large cavalry force, the Union eventually fielded some 258 mounted regiments and 170 unattached companies, of differing enlistment periods, throughout the war and suffered 10,596 killed and 26,490 wounded during the struggle.[34][35][36]

The Union cavalry was disadvantaged at the start of the war because Northern soldiers allegedly had less comparative equestrian experience than their Southern counterparts, and the Union army did not institute an examination in basic horsemanship before a recruit was mustered into service until August 1862.[37] In addition, over half (104 out of 176) of the experienced U.S. Army cavalry officers had resigned their commissions to fight for the Confederacy. One advantage the Union horseman had over his opponent was the centralized horse procurement organization of the army, relieving him of any responsibility for replacing an injured horse. Commanders often tried to procure specific breeds for their men, with the Morgan being a particular favorite within the Army of the Potomac. Famous Morgan cavalry mounts from the Civil War included Sheridan's "Rienzi"[38] and Stonewall Jackson's "Little Sorrel".

Early in the war, Union cavalry forces were often wasted by being used merely as pickets, outposts, orderlies, guards for senior officers, and messengers. The first officer to make effective use of the Union cavalry was Major General Joseph Hooker, who in 1863 consolidated the cavalry forces of his Army of the Potomac under a single commander, George Stoneman.

Union cavalry charge at Honey Springs, July 1863.

Halfway into the war, during the summer of 1863, the Union cavalry came into its own. Widely regarded as inferior to its Southern counterpart up until then, the Battle of Brandy Station, although tactically indecisive, is recognized as the point at which it was acknowledged to have comparable competence.[39]

In 1864, Philip Sheridan was given command of the Cavalry Corps of the Army of the Potomac, and he deployed his horsemen in a more effective, strategic way than his predecessors. Despite the reluctance of his superior, Major General George G. Meade, Sheridan convinced General-in-Chief Ulysses S. Grant to allow him to deploy the cavalry in long-range raids, the first of which, at Yellow Tavern, resulted in the death of Confederate commander Jeb Stuart. He later employed his cavalry force effectively in the Valley Campaigns of 1864 and the Appomattox Campaign, in pursuit of Robert E. Lee.[40]

In the Western Theater, two effective cavalry generals have not achieved the fame of their Eastern counterparts: Benjamin Grierson's dramatic raid through Mississippi was an integral part of Ulysses S. Grant's Vicksburg Campaign; James H. Wilson was invaluable in the Franklin-Nashville Campaign and in his 1865 Alabama raid.

Further information: Cavalry Corps (Union Army)
Further information: U.S. Army Remount Service

Significant cavalry battles and raids

The following are Civil War battles, campaigns, or separate raids in which cavalry forces played a significant role.

Cavalry fight at Yellow Tavern, by Edwin Forbes.

Notable cavalry leaders and partisan rangers

References
  1. Belcher, D. W. (2018). The Union Cavalry and the Chickamauga Campaign. United States: McFarland, Incorporated, Publishers. p. 12
  2. Coggins, J. (2004). Arms and Equipment of the Civil War. United Kingdom: Dover Publications. p. 48-49
  3. Griffith, P. (2001). Battle Tactics of the Civil War. United Kingdom: Yale University Press. p. 69
  4. Urwin, G. J. W. (2003). The United States Cavalry: An Illustrated History, 1776-1944. United States: University of Oklahoma Press. p. 121
  5. Gudmens, J. J. (2005). Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862. United States: Combat Studies Institute Press. p. 18-24
  6. Hess, E. J. (2008). The Rifle Musket in Civil War Combat: Reality and Myth. United States: University Press of Kansas. p. 210-212
  7. Griffith (2001), p. 121
  8. Griffith (2001), p. 181-182
  9. Griffith (2001), p. 184-185
  10. Coggins (2004), p. 50
  11. Griffith, P. (2001) p. 182-183
  12. Urwin (2003), p. 120, 129
  13. Stubbs, M. L., Connor, S. R. (1969). Armor-Cavalry: Regular Army and Army Reserve. United States: Office of the Chief of Military History, U.S. Army. p. 14-18
  14. Eicher, J., Eicher, D. (2002). Civil War High Commands. United States: Stanford University Press. p. 66-67
  15. Urwin, G. J. W. (2003). The United States Cavalry: An Illustrated History, 1776-1944. United States: University of Oklahoma Press. p. 110-113
  16. Gudmens, J. J. (2005). Staff Ride Handbook for the Battle of Shiloh, 6-7 April 1862. United States: Combat Studies Institute Press. p. 4-6
  17. Starr, S. Z. (2007). The Union Cavalry in the Civil War: From Fort Sumter to Gettysburg, 1861–1863. United Kingdom: LSU Press. p. 465
  18. Wilson, J. B. (1998). Maneuver and Firepower: The Evolution of Divisions and Separate Brigades. United States: Center of Military History, U.S. Army. p. 13-18
  19. Eicher, p. 73.
  20. Cooke, Philip St. George. Cavalry Tactics, Or, Regulations for the Instruction, Formations, and Movements of the Cavalry of the Army and Volunteers of the United States, Vol. 1-2. Washington: G.P.O., 1861. Archived (1862)
  21. Field, Ron. Confederate Cavalryman versus Union Cavalryman: Eastern Theater 1861-65. Osprey Publishing, 2015
  22. National Archives, RG 92, James A. Ekin to Montgomery Meigs, January 31, 1866
  23. Knopp, Ken R. Confederate Saddles and Horse Equipment. Orange, VA: Publisher’s Press, Inc., 2001.
  24. National Archives, RG 92, Quartermaster Department Circular, "Instructions for Inspectors of Cavalry Horses," February 5, 1864; Gerleman, David J. "Warhorse! Union Cavalry Mounts." North and South Magazine (January 1999)
  25. Reports of Committees of the House of Representatives, 37th Cong., 2d sess., 1861-62, part I, 84; O.R.III, vol. 5, 256
  26. O.R. Series I, vol. XXIX, pt. 2, 423
  27. "Our Cavalry," The United States Army and Navy Journal, I (February 1864); Gerleman, David J. "A Blot on the Army: Veterinary Care in the Union Cavalry, 1861–1865," Smithsonian Institution Civil War Sesquicentennial Symposium, November 2012
  28. Crouch, Howard R. Horse Equipment of the Civil War Era. Fairfax, Va.: SCS Publications, 2003.
  29. McAulay, John D. Carbines of the U.S. Cavalry 1861–1905. Lincoln, RI: Andrew Mowbray Inc, 1996.
  30. "The Only Lancer Charge in the Civil War".
  31. Hamner, Christopher. "Union Cavalry." Teachinghistory.org. Accessed 11 July 2011.
  32. Coggins (2012), p. 47
  33. Urwin (2003), p. 117
  34. Eric J. Wittenberg. The Cavalry: Overview of Union cavalry in the Eastern Theatre of the Civil War up to the Battle of Gettysburg
  35. "Cavalry, U.S.A." in Encyclopedia of the American Civil War, David S. Heidler and Jeanne T. Heidler, eds., Vol. 1, A-C, (ABC-CLIO Publishers, 2000), pp. 378-381
  36. Steven Z. Starr. The Union Cavalry in The Civil War, 3 vols. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1979-1985.
  37. O.R. Series III, vol II, 381
  38. Pedigree of Reinz, a famous Morgan horse used by General Philip H. Sheridan.
  39. Laurence D. Schiller. Essential Civil War Curriculum: The Evolution of Union Cavalry, 1861-1865, Virginia Center for Civil War Studies at Virginia Tech
  40. Edward Longacre. Mounted Raids of the Civil War. South Brunswick, NJ: A. S. Barnes, 1975.

Further reading
  • Gerleman, David J. "Warhorse! Union Cavalry Mounts." North and South Magazine Vol. 2, No. 2, (January 1999), pp. 47–61.
  • Longacre, Edward G. Lincoln's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of the Potomac. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2000. ISBN 0-8117-1049-1.
  • Longacre, Edward G. The Cavalry at Gettysburg. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press, 1986. ISBN 0-8032-7941-8.
  • Longacre, Edward G. General John Buford: A Military Biography. Conshohocken, PA: Combined Publishing, 1995. ISBN 0-938289-46-2.
  • Longacre, Edward G. Lee's Cavalrymen: A History of the Mounted Forces of the Army of Northern Virginia. Mechanicsburg, PA: Stackpole Books, 2002. ISBN 0-8117-0898-5.
  • Longacre, Edward G., and Eric J. Wittenberg. Unpublished remarks to the Civil War Institute. Gettysburg College, June 2005.
  • Mackey, Robert R. The UnCivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861-1865. Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 2004. ISBN 0-8061-3624-3.
  • Nosworthy, Brent. The Bloody Crucible of Courage, Fighting Methods and Combat Experience of the Civil War. New York: Carroll and Graf Publishers, 2003. ISBN 0-7867-1147-7.
  • Starr, Stephen Z. The Union Cavalry in the Civil War. Vol. 1, From Fort Sumter to Gettysburg 1861–1863. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. ISBN 978-0-8071-3291-3.
  • Starr, Stephen Z. The Union Cavalry in the Civil War. Vol. 2, The War in the East from Gettysburg to Appomattox 1863–1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. ISBN 978-0-8071-3292-0.
  • Starr, Stephen Z. The Union Cavalry in the Civil War. Vol. 3, The War in the West 1861–1865. Baton Rouge: Louisiana State University Press, 1981. ISBN 978-0-8071-3293-7.
  • Wills, Brian Steel. The Confederacy's Greatest Cavalryman: Nathan Bedford Forrest. Lawrence: University Press of Kansas, 1992. ISBN 0-7006-0885-0.
  • Wittenberg, Eric J. Glory Enough For All: Sheridan's Second Raid and the Battle of Trevilian Station. Washington, DC: Brassey's, Inc., 2001. ISBN 1-57488-468-9.
  • Wittenberg, Eric J. The Battle of Brandy Station: North America's Largest Cavalry Battle. Charleston, SC: The History Press, 2010. ISBN 978-1-59629-782-1.
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