Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity

The Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (in Spanish: Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca, URNG-MAIZ or most commonly URNG) is a Guatemalan political party that started as a guerrilla movement but laid down its arms in 1996 and became a legal political party in 1998 after the peace process which ended the Guatemalan Civil War.

Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity
Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca
AbbreviationURNG-MAIZ
General SecretaryGregorio Chay
Founded8 February 1982[1]
Legalised18 December 1998
Merger ofEGP
FAR
ORPA
PGT
PGT-NDN
HeadquartersGuatemala City
Ideology
Political positionLeft-wing[2][3] to far-left[7]
Regional affiliationSão Paulo Forum
ColorsRed, Green, Yellow (logo)
Blue, White (flag)
Congress
3 / 160
Party flag
Website
www.urng-maiz.org.gt

History

Background

Since the CIA-backed coup in 1954, opposition groups were continuously forming in an attempt to fight against the repression that the military and wealthy landowners in Guatemala had created.[8] The ensuing military dictatorship of Carlos Castillo Armas immediately banned labor unions and left-wing parties, like the Guatemalan Party of Labour.[9][10] After the assassination of Castillo Armas by a left-wing sympathising member of the presidential guard, Miguel Ydígoras Fuentes prevailed in the ensuing power struggle. The continued repression, coupled with an ever closer alignment of the Guatemalan government with the United States government, as well as rampant corruption and favoritism led to a rebellion by a group of dissident officers, which later named themselves Revolutionary Movement 13th November (MR-13) in reference to the incident.[11] The failed coup d'état on 13 November 1960 usually marks the beginning of the Guatemalan Civil War, a bloody affair that lasted 36 years and claimed the lives of an estimated 200,000 people.[10] With United States military assistance the guerrilla were uprooted from eastern Guatemala and had to flee to neighboring Honduras.[12] Remnants of the MR-13 returned in 1962 and established the first guerrilla group, the Rebel Armed Forces.[10][13] The failure of the Bay of Pigs Invasion in April 1961 convinced part of the military and the United States to rid themselves of Fuentes, which finally succeeded after several attempts in March 1963, marking the beginning of Guatemala's first authentic military regime.[14][15] In 1966, the law-professor Julio César Méndez Montenegro was elected to the presidency, but was only allowed to take up the position under the condition, that he would not interfere in matters of internal security and the military.[16] The year also saw the creation of Mano Blanca, a right-wing paramilitary group associated with the MLN, founded to prohibit Méndez Montenegro from taking office and to counter left-wing activism.[17][18] The subsequent "white terror" coupled with the Zacapa program, severely crippled the guerrilla force based in eastern Guatemala, which in turn tried to avoid detection by hiding in cities.[19] The FAR responded by resorting to various assassinations and abductions during the late 1960's to early 1970's, like those of John Gordon Mein and Karl von Spreti.[20][21] The tense security situation led both right-wing military factions, namely the MLN and PID to unify for the elections in 1970, to counter the reforms initiated under Méndez Montenegro, which the army perceived as infringing on their autonomy.[22] The incoming government of Carlos Manuel Arana Osorio initiated another counterinsurgency to stifle the FAR and began to entrench the military in the Guatemalan economy, chiefly by establishing the Army Bank, which handed out loans to the officer corps.[23] As a consequence of the repression, a large contigent of the FAR came to the conclusion that they needed to change their strategy.[24] Instead of continuing with the foco strategy of confronting the army in the countryside, which inflicted heavy losses on them, they saw the need to expand their social base to indigenous communities and middle class intellectuals and professionals.[25] This perception gave rise to the Organization of People in Arms and Guerrilla Army of the Poor in the early 1970's.[25] The former was formed in 1971 as the Organización Regional de Occidente, as a branch of the FAR in Western Guatemala, before splitting outright in mid 1972.[26] The group had a gestation period of 8 years, operating clandestinely, mainly recruiting soldiers and accruing arms, before commiting their first action in September 1979.[27]

Formation

In the backdrop of the civil war the URNG formed as a leftist umbrella organization consisting of four groups: the Guerrilla Army of the Poor (EGP), the Revolutionary Organization of People in Arms (ORPA), the Rebel Armed Forces (FAR) and the National Directing Nucleus of PGT (PGT-NDN).[25] The unification process was mediated by the Cuban government, who only wanted to support a unitary and forceful insurgency.[28] In consequence the group became the public face of the long-running insurgency against the Guatemalan government throughout the Guatemalan Civil War.[29] Later on, the URNG led the leftist opposition in peace negotiations with the conservative Guatemalan government.[29] These negotiations began in 1986 and brought the end of the civil war when negotiations finished in December 1996, by signing the Firm and Lasting Agreement.[30] The conclusion of the peace talks led the URNG to pursue the registration as a legal party inside the Guatemalan political system in June 1997.[25] The group was formally registered as a political party in December 1998.[25]

Civil war era

In March 1982, only one month after their formation, the URNG experienced an attack ordered by then president, retired General Efraín Ríos Montt. Backed by the CIA, Ríos Montt led a "scorched-earth" counter-insurgency campaign against the URNG and its supporters until he was toppled the following year.[25] During his rule, Rios Montt tried to eradicate the insurgency by banning the activities of political parties and commiting various massacres against the population in the Guatemalan highlands, thereby removing the recruitment pool of the URNG.[31] He and his associates ascribed critique on their measures to an "international communist conspiracy" of which Amnesty International and the Catholic Church were also a part of.[31] Rios Montt's eventual downfall from power followed a similar path as his ascension, with a coup by his Minister of Defence Óscar Humberto Mejía Víctores in August 1983.[32]

The URNG employed ambushes and raids on government security forces as their main tactic, and also performed bombings and assassinations. They attacked the military, government officials, as well as foreign diplomats and foreign businesses. The government responded with undercover death-squads, supported by the police and military, who undertook the mission to take down prominent leftists.[29]

After the election of Vinicio Cerezo in 1985, the truncated civil society in Guatemala revitalised to some degree, which convinced a significant part of mid-level cadres to abandon armed struggle, subsequently reducing the organisations leverage during the peace negotiations.[33] By the time a civilian government returned to office in 1986, the URNG recognized that coming to power through armed struggle was out of the question, and they took initiatives to negotiate a political solution.

According to a report in NACLA's Report on the Americas (May/June 1997),

The government and army maintained that since they had "defeated" the URNG, they had no need to negotiate until the guerrillas had laid down their arms. The subsequent settlements ending the wars in Nicaragua and El Salvador stiffened the elites' resolve "never" to permit such an outcome in Guatemala.[34]

The URNG functioned as an umbrella organization to represent the leftist beliefs amongst the Guatemalan people, particularly the Guatemalan poor. Although they were involved in attacks, their primary function was at the negotiation table with the Guatemalan government.

Peace process

From 1986 to 1996, the army and government were drawn into a peace process moderated and verified by the United Nations and including other international actors as key players. During the negotiations both sides made major concessions. The UN mediated Oslo Agreement provided an arrangement for direct negotiation between the belligerent groups. This open negotiation led to the signing of the "Agreement on Procedures in Search of Peace by Political Means" in Mexico in 1991. The United Nations presided over these changes meant to create a long-lasting peace.[35] Obligations were imposed on the government, including significant constitutional reforms, which were internationally binding and would be verified by the UN. After 9 years of negotiations in 1995, the leadership of the URNG came to a preliminary agreement with the government to sign a peace deal in 1996.[36]

In 1987 URNG substituted PGT-NDN for the Guatemalan Party of Labour (PGT) in its leadership. The political party is interested in disarmament, demobilization and integration process as outlined by the United Nations. It is now a peaceful political party that is part of the New Alliance Bloc.

On 29 December 1996, a peace agreement was signed by the government and the URNG in the presence of UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali, officially ending the 36-year civil war.[36] The signing ceremony was held in front of the National Palace of Culture on the Plaza de la Constición in the presence of about 50,000 people.[36] Among a cheerful crowd, a flame of peace was lit by the signatories inmidst the place to symbolise the end of armed conflict.[36] The Secretary-General of the URNG, Comandante Rolando Morán and president Álvaro Arzú jointly received the UNESCO Peace Prize for their efforts to end the civil war and attain the peace agreement.

The UNRG has since apologized for the atrocities that occurred during the Guatemalan Civil War, asking forgiveness from all victims, families and other who experienced any kind of excesses. This apology came two days after President Clinton admitted the role of the United States in a "dark and painful period" during the civil war in Guatemala.[37] After Rolando Moran died in September 1998, Jorge Soto was elected to succeed him as Secretary General of the party.[38] In May 1999, as a provision of the peace agreement, a constitutional referendum was held to amend the constitution.[39] All 4 provisions failed to win a majority, albeit amid a low voter turnout.

The party made its national electoral debut during the elections in 1999, joining forces with 2 minor left-wing parties, the Authentic Integral Development and Unidad de la Izquierda Democrática to contest the elections as the New Nation Alliance.[40][41] The alliance, which was finalised on 12 February 1999, nominated the moderate Álvaro Colom, who would in 2011 be elected as president for National Unity of Hope, as their presidential candidate.[41][42] He came in third with about 12.4% of the vote. The alliance also achieved the third place in the legislative election with 11% of the national vote, thereby electing 9 Congress members. The party drew significant support from part of their former strongholds and majority indigenous departments Huehuetenango, Quetzaltenango and El Quiché, where in each the alliance was able to win an electoral district seat.[43]

In August 2001, Rodrigo Asturias was elected to replace Jorge Soto as Secretary General and subsequently developed a cosier relationship with the ruling FRG, which was founded by its former archenemy Rios Montt.[38] The new party line was met with significant opposition from within the party, leading first to the resignation of Arnoldo Noriega, a former leader inside the EGP and critique from Soto, who rejected cooperation with the FRG.[38] Later in May 2002, Soto also left the party to found the New Nation Alternative, taking fewer than 200 members with him.[38]

In the legislative election, held on 9 November 2003, the severely fractured party saw their vote share decrease to 4.2% of the popular vote, returning 2 out of 158 seats to Congress.[44] In the presidential election held the same day, its candidate Rodrigo Asturias won 2.6% of the popular vote.

After the elections party leaders also cited their lack of knowledge about the political system and electoral campaigning as reasons for their limited electoral success.[45] After Rodrigo Asturias passed away in June 2005, Hector Nuila was selected to succeed him as Secretary General.[46] In the preparation phase for the next election, MAIZ was founded as a leftist platform, representing various leftist organizations.[47]

At the 2007 elections, the party won with 3.7% 2 seats in the congressional elections. In the presidential election of the same day, its candidate Miguel Ángel Sandoval won 2.1% of the popular vote.

For the elections in 2011 the party entered into a political alliance with Winaq, MNR, the URNG splinter ANN and 60 civil society groups to form the Broad Front of the Left.[48] Broadly seen as a positive development inside the left, the coalition only yielded limited electoral success, returning only two seats, one each for San Marcos and Huehuetenango, to the legislature with approximately 3.3% in the congressional elections and 3.2% for the presidential candidate and Winaq founder Rigoberta Menchú.[49]

The coalition was maintained for the 2015 elections and was able to increase their vote share to almost 4.4%, but the party only maintained their single legislator in Congress via winning a congressional district. In the presidential elections the Broad Front of the Left unified behind the presidential candidacy of Miguel Ángel Sandoval, who received about 2.1% of the vote. In May 2019 in the run-up to the next elections, the party was one of 5 left leaning parties that declined to participate in a conference hosted by the Asociación la Familia Importa for a conservative pact concerning the "defense of family and life".[50][51]

The coaltition split up ahead of the elections in 2019, but the party was nonetheless able to reach 2.8% among the national electorate and even increased their number of elected deputies to 3. Before the start of the election campaign, the party committee held talks with Thelma Aldana, founder of Semilla, to discuss the possible support of her candidacy, but as she was barred from participating in the election by the Constitutional Court due to questionable accusations of corruption, the party ultimately nominated Pablo Ceto and Blanca Estela Colop.[52][53] Ceto, who had already been a vice presidential candidate for the party in 2003, campaigned on a reinvigorated peace process as well as the eradication of poverty and roughly maintained their last result with 2.2% of the vote.[3]

The party by and large opposed the government of Alejandro Giammattei after the election and particularly opposed the dismissal of Juan Francisco Sandoval as head prosecutor of the Special Prosecutor's Office against Impunity in July 2021.[54] In June 2022, the former presidential candidate for the party in 2007 and the Broad Front of the Left in 2015, Miguel Ángel Sandoval wrote an open letter to party leadership of his own party, the Movement for the Liberation of Peoples, Semilla and Winaq, calling for a fresh political and electoral alliance.[55] He cited the Historic Pact for Colombia and the Brazil of Hope coalitions as successful role models for cross ideological alliances.[55] On 29 January 2023, URNG and Winaq made their renewed alliance public and announced their plans to nominate Amílcar Pop and Mónica Enríquez as their presidential ticket for the upcoming elections.[56] Moreover, the parties aim to cooperate with Semilla to win the mayorship of Guatemala City.[56]

Support base

During the civil war the group received support from Guatemala's rural poor as well as from urban intellectuals.[29] The URNG enjoyed high support among indigenous communities, which was reflected in the fact that 82% of its demobilised armed combatants and 50% of its political activists came from an indigenous background.[57] After the conclusion of peace negotioations, the URNG was only partially able to maintain this constituency, as other sections organised inside the Democratic Front New Guatemala.[43]

Election results

Congress of the Republic

Election Votes  % Seats +/– Status
1999 233,870 11.04 (#3) [lower-alpha 1]
9 / 113
9 Opposition
2003 107,276 4.20 (#7)
2 / 158
7 Opposition
2007 112,249 2.78 (#10)
2 / 158
0 Opposition
2011 143,238 3.27 (#7) [lower-alpha 2]
2 / 158
0 Opposition
2015 198,715 4.36 (#9) [lower-alpha 2]
1 / 158
1 Opposition
2019 112,037 2.78 (#16)
3 / 160
2 Opposition

President of the Republic of Guatemala

Election Candidates First round Second round Status
President Vice President Votes  % Votes  %
1999 Álvaro Colom Vitalino Similox Salazar 270,891 12.36 (#3) [lower-alpha 1] Lost
2003 Rodrigo Asturias Pablo Ceto 69,297 2.58 (#6) Lost
2007 Miguel Ángel Sandoval Walda Barrios Ruiz 70,208 2.14 (#10) Lost
2011 Rigoberta Menchú Aníbal García 145,080 3.26 (#6) [lower-alpha 2] Lost
2015 Miguel Ángel Sandoval Mario Ellintong 101,347 2.11 (#11) [lower-alpha 2] Lost
2019 Pablo Ceto Blanca Estela Colop 94,531 2.16 (#12) Lost

Notes

  1. Part of the New Nation Alliance.
  2. Part of the Broad Front of the Left.

See also

References

  1. Allison, Michael E. (2006). Leaving the past behind? A study of the FMLN and URNG transitions to political parties (PhD). The Florida State University. p. 62. Retrieved 29 January 2023.
  2. "Treinta años de la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca (URNG)". albedrío.org (in Spanish). 28 January 2012.
  3. Orozco, Andrea (3 May 2019). "Pablo Ceto: "Los programas sociales inhabilitan a la gente"". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. Retrieved 18 October 2022.
  4. "Enfoque Electoral No. 22-Salieron a flote el 16 de junio los intereses económicos y políticos oligárquicos" (PDF). El Observador (in Spanish). June 2019. Osmundo Ponce es un viejo militante del Ejército Guerrillero de los Pobres (EGP) que se convirtió en pastor posteriormente a la firma de la paz, de una denominación evangélica no relacionada con las iglesias neopentencostales.
  5. "Nos unimos a rechazo por amenazas de intervención contra pueblo y Gobierno de Venezuela". 15 August 2017.
  6. "Somos la Unidad Revolucionaria Nacional Guatemalteca". 22 August 2014.
  7. "El 69 aniversario del PGT y el compromiso con la Revolución Socialista". 26 September 2018.
  8. "End of Spring". Archived from the original on 2016-10-01. Retrieved 2011-07-02.
  9. Wilkinson, Daniel (2002). Silence on the Mountain: Stories of Terror, Betrayal, and Forgetting in Guatemala. Houghton Mifflin. p. 124. ISBN 9780618221394.
  10. Allison 2006, p. 61.
  11. McClintock, Michael (1985). "State Terror and Popular Resistance in Guatemala". The American Connection. Vol. 2. London, UK: Zed. pp. 49–50. ISBN 9780862322595.
  12. McClintock 1985, p. 50.
  13. Giovanni, Batz (2013). "Military factionalism and the consolidation of power in 1960s Guatemala." (PDF). In Garrard-Burnett, Virginia; Lawrence, Mark Atwood; Moreno, Julia E (eds.). Beyond the Eagle’s Shadow: New Histories of Latin America’s Cold War. Vol. 2. Albuquerque, USA: University of New Mexico Press. p. 60. ISBN 9780826353689.
  14. May, Rachel (March 1999). ""Surviving All Changes is Your Destiny": Violence and Popular Movements in Guatemala". Latin American Perspectives. 26 (2): 72–73. doi:10.1177/0094582x9902600204. S2CID 143564997.
  15. Batz 2013, p. 54.
  16. Batz 2013, p. 58.
  17. Grandin, Greg; Klein, Naomi (30 July 2011). The Last Colonial Massacre: Latin America in the Cold War. University of Chicago Press. pp. 87–89. ISBN 978-0-226-30690-2.
  18. Batz 2013, p. 64.
  19. Batz 2013, p. 63-65.
  20. Blumenau, Bernhard (2014). The United Nations and Terrorism. Germany, Multilateralism, and Antiterrorism Efforts in the 1970s. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan. pp. 41–45. ISBN 978-1-137-39196-4.
  21. "Information Memorandum From the Acting Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs (Vaky) to Secretary of State Rusk". Foreign Relations of the United States, 1964–1968. U.S. Dept. of State, Office of the Historian. XXXI, South and Central America. August 29, 1968.
  22. Batz 2013, p. 67.
  23. Batz 2013, p. 67-68.
  24. Jonas, Susanne (1991). The Battle for Guatemala: Rebels, Death Squads, and U.S. Power. Westview Press. p. 138. ISBN 978-0813306148.
  25. Allison 2006, p. 62.
  26. Bibler, Jared S. (2007). The Ideological Underpinnings of the Revolutionary Organization of the People in Arms (Master). Ohio University. p. 22-23. Retrieved 13 February 2023.
  27. Bibler 2007, p. 23.
  28. Allison 2006, p. 95-96.
  29. "Terrorist Organization Profile: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity (URNG)". Archived from the original on 2013-12-21. Retrieved 2011-07-02.
  30. Allison 2006, p. 35.
  31. Black, George (2012). "Guatemala's conversion" (PDF). NACLA Report on the Americas. 45 (1): 95–97.
  32. Batz 2013, p. 68.
  33. Allison 2006, p. 96.
  34. Jonas, Susanne (1997). "The Peace Accords: An". NACLA Report on the Americas. 30 (6): 6–10. doi:10.1080/10714839.1997.11722821.
  35. Max Planck; Jochen Abr Frowein (23 October 1998). Yearbook of United Nations Law 1998. p. 251. ISBN 9789041196651.
  36. "Gobierno y URNG firman la paz en 1996". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. 29 December 2022. Retrieved 25 January 2023.
  37. "Article Collections: Guatemalan National Revolutionary Unity". The New York Times.
  38. Allison 2006, p. 97.
  39. Allison 2006, p. 90.
  40. Sarah Zukerman Daly (2022). Violent Victors: Why Bloodstained Parties Win Postwar Elections. Princeton University Press. p. 313. ISBN 9780691231334.
  41. Allison 2006, p. 63.
  42. Allison 2006, p. 132.
  43. Allison 2006, p. 127.
  44. Allison 2006, p. 118.
  45. Allison, Michael E. (2016). "The Guatemalan National Revolutionary unit: the long collapse". Democratization. 23 (6): 1050–1051. doi:10.1080/13510347.2016.1159557.
  46. Bibler 2007, p. 11.
  47. Lambert, Renaud (14 September 2007). "Die Oligarchen bitten zur Wahl". Le Monde diplomatique (in German). Translated from the French original by Herwig Engelmann. Le Monde Publicité S.A. Retrieved 13 February 2023.
  48. Löding, Torge (September 2011). "Wahlen in Guatemala 2011: Präsident Colom hat sich verrechnet" (PDF). Standpunkte (in German). Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
  49. Allison 2016, p. 1048-1050.
  50. Toro, David (15 May 2019). "15 binomios presidenciales firman pacto conservador". Prensa Communitaria (in Spanish). Retrieved 20 January 2023.
  51. Abbott, Jeff (11 June 2019). "Democracy in Crisis in Guatemala". NACLA. Retrieved 21 January 2023.
  52. Austen, Thorben (12 June 2019). "Elections in Guatemala". Publication. Rosa Luxemburg Stiftung. Retrieved 18 September 2022.
  53. Castañeda, Miguel Barrientos (26 March 2019). "Binomio presidencial de URNG recibe credenciales en el TSE". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. Retrieved 5 October 2022.
  54. Austen, Thorben (28 July 2021). "Chef der Anti-Korruptionsermittlung in Guatemala entlassen". amerika21 (in German). Mondial21 e. V. Retrieved 15 October 2022.
  55. Austen, Thorben (25 June 2022). "Initiative für die Einheit der progressiven Parteien in Guatemala". amerika21 (in German). Mondial21 e. V. Retrieved 15 October 2022.
  56. "URNG y Winaq confirman coalición y proclaman a su binomio presidencial para las Elecciones Generales 2023". Prensa Libre (in Spanish). Prensa Libre, S.A. 29 January 2023. Retrieved 31 January 2023.
  57. Luciak, Ilja A. (2001). After the revolution: Gender and democracy in El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Guatemala. Baltimore, USA: JHU Press. p. 50. ISBN 0801867800.
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